In Laughlin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The petitioner, Laughlin, had been convicted in a federal court of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus in this case. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy that is available only to those who are in custody under the authority of the state, and not to those who are in custody under the authority of the federal government. The Court further held that the state court did not have the authority to review the constitutionality of a federal conviction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus in this case. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Laughlin v. Mitchell, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and equity. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced as written, unless there is an explicit provision for its modification or termination. In this case, he noted that no such provision existed; thus, it was wrong for the court to allow one of the parties to unilaterally terminate their agreement without any legal justification. Furthermore, Justice Field pointed out that even if there had been some ambiguity in interpreting the contract terms at issue here - which he did not believe existed - then it would have been up to a jury rather than a judge to decide how those terms should be interpreted and applied. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded by stating his belief that allowing either party in this case to renege on their contractual obligations would set an undesirable precedent and lead only further confusion regarding contracts going forward.