Cornelius W. Lawrence was the plaintiff in error in this Supreme Court case, which involved a dispute over a contract between him and Gilbert Allen and Samuel C. Paxton. The contract stated that Lawrence would be paid $1,000 for his services as an agent of Allen and Paxton to purchase certain lands from the state of Indiana. However, when it came time to pay out the money due under the agreement, Allen and Paxton refused on grounds that they had not received any benefit from their investment with Lawrence; thus he was not entitled to payment according to them. The court ultimately ruled against Allen and Paxton's argument by finding that there were sufficient benefits derived from their association with Lawrence such as obtaining title deeds for land purchases made through his agency; therefore he should receive full compensation for his services rendered per terms outlined in their original agreement.

In the case of Cornelius W. Lawrence v Gilbert Allen and Samuel C. Paxton, the dissenting opinion argued that a contract between two parties should not be voided simply because one party was under duress when signing it. The dissent stated that if this were to become precedent, then any contract could be easily invalidated by claiming duress at any time after its execution. Furthermore, they argued that there was no evidence presented in court to prove beyond reasonable doubt that either party had acted with malice or fraud during the formation of their agreement; therefore, it would be unjust for them to suffer from such an extreme consequence as having their entire contract declared void due to a single act of alleged coercion on behalf of one individual involved in said transaction. In conclusion, the dissent concluded that while some contracts may indeed need protection from undue influence or pressure tactics used by certain individuals during negotiations and signings alike; however, this particular case did not provide sufficient proof nor legal basis for such an action being taken against these two parties who had entered into what appeared to have been a fair and equitable agreement prior to its execution