In Lawson v. Floyd, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The petitioner, Lawson, had been convicted in a federal court of a crime and was serving his sentence in a state prison. He sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, not state prisoners. The Court's decision in Lawson v. Floyd established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners convicted in federal courts. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Lawson v. Floyd, arguing that the court should not have reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia. He argued that there was no error committed by the state court and thus it was improper for this Court to review its judgment. Field further noted that even if an error had been made, it would be up to the state courts to correct their own mistakes as they are better equipped than federal courts when dealing with matters concerning local laws and customs. Furthermore, he argued that since this case involved a dispute between two individuals over land ownership rights, which is traditionally handled at a state level rather than through federal jurisdiction, then any errors or disputes should be resolved within Georgia's legal system instead of being brought before this Court for review. In conclusion Justice Field believed that reversing decisions from lower courts without proper cause sets dangerous precedent and undermines public confidence in our judicial system as well as respect for established law.