Lawther v. Hamilton was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Lawther, was held in a federal prison in the District of Columbia. Lawther sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, but the court refused to issue the writ. Lawther then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court's decision in Lawther v. Hamilton established that state courts do not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Lawther v. Hamilton, a case concerning an action of ejectment brought by William Lawther against John Hamilton for land located in California. Justice Field argued that the majority's decision was incorrect because it failed to consider certain facts and evidence presented at trial which showed that there had been no adverse possession of the property by either party prior to 1851 when California became part of the United States. He further noted that even if one assumed such possession existed, it would not be sufficient to establish title since both parties were citizens of Mexico before 1851 and thus could not have acquired title under American law until after this date. Finally, he concluded that any attempt to apply Mexican law retroactively would violate due process principles as well as established precedent from other cases involving similar issues.