In the case of Lecil W. Dean, Appt. v. Robert D. Harvey, Administrator of W.H. Younell, Deceased, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to grant a writ of mandamus to a probate court. The case arose when Lecil W. Dean, the appointed administrator of the estate of W.H. Younell, deceased, sought to have the probate court issue a writ of mandamus to compel the administrator of the estate, Robert D. Harvey, to pay him the amount due to him as administrator. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the probate court. The Court reasoned that the probate court was a court of limited jurisdiction and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the probate court's decision. The Court further held that the state court could not issue a writ of mandamus to compel the probate court to act in a certain way. The Court's decision in this case established that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the probate court. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it has been used to support the principle that the state court cannot interfere with the decisions of the probate court.

In the case of Lecil W. Dean, Appt., v. Robert D. Harvey, Administrator of W.H Yountell, Deceased (1869), Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the court should not have reversed its prior decision and held that an administrator was liable for debts incurred by his decedent before his appointment as such administrator had been made official by probate court order or decree. He believed this would be contrary to established law and precedent in many states across the country where administrators were only responsible for debts contracted after their appointment became effective through probate court orders or decrees; thus making them personally liable for any pre-existing debt obligations incurred by their decedents before they took office as administrators over those estates. In conclusion, Justice Field felt strongly that reversing previous decisions on this matter would create unnecessary confusion among creditors who may now expect to collect from both pre-existing and post-appointment debtors when it comes to estate administration matters going forward into the future