In the case of Leiman et al. v. Guttman et al., 1948, the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with resolving a dispute over bankruptcy proceedings. The appellants, who were creditors in a bankruptcy case, contested that certain payments made by the bankrupt party to other creditors (the appellees) within four months prior to filing for bankruptcy should be deemed as preferential transfers and thus voidable under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. The lower courts had ruled in favor of these appellee-creditors on grounds that they had no reasonable cause to believe that their debtor was insolvent at time of payment - an essential condition for invoking Section 60's provisions against preference. The Supreme Court reversed this decision upon appeal, holding that insolvency is presumed during such period preceding bankruptcy declaration unless proven otherwise; hence it wasn't incumbent upon appellant-creditors to prove actual knowledge or reasonable cause thereof on part of those paid off earlier by their common debtor. This ruling effectively shifted burden onto latter group (appellees) if they wished contesting applicability of said statutory provision.

In the dissenting opinion for Leiman et al. v. Guttman et al., Justice Jackson disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, arguing that it was not intended to allow a debtor corporation to use bankruptcy proceedings as a means to escape its obligations under state law. He contended that such an interpretation would undermine states' rights and upset federal-state balance by allowing corporations to evade state laws simply by declaring bankruptcy. Furthermore, he argued that this case did not involve insolvent or financially distressed companies but rather profitable ones seeking protection from their creditors through misuse of bankruptcy laws. Thus, according to him, using Section 77B in this manner was contrary both to its original intent and spirit.