In the case of Lessee of Isaac Atkinson v. John Cummins, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a lessee had an action for damages against a third party who wrongfully entered and took possession of leased land. The plaintiff in error argued that he had such an action because his lease gave him exclusive possession and use of the property during its term. The defendant contended that since he did not enter into any contract with the plaintiff, there could be no cause for action against him. After considering both sides' arguments, the court held that although there was no express agreement between them, it would imply one from their actions which allowed for legal redress if either party breached it. Therefore, they found in favor of the plaintiff and ruled that he did have an actionable claim against Cummings for entering onto his leased land without permission or authority to do so.

In the case of Lessee of Isaac Atkinson v. John Cummins, the dissenting opinion argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced as written and not interpreted in favor of one party over another. The majority opinion had held that certain language within the contract was ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean different things depending on which party's interpretation was accepted. The dissent disagreed with this conclusion, arguing instead that such language should not be subject to interpretation but rather taken at face value according to its plain meaning. Furthermore, they argued that if any ambiguity did exist it should have been resolved by resorting to evidence outside the four corners of the document itself or through parol evidence from witnesses who were familiar with both parties' intentions when entering into the agreement. Ultimately, while recognizing their colleagues' decision as binding precedent for future cases involving similar facts and circumstances, they concluded their dissent by noting their disagreement with how this particular dispute had been decided due to what they viewed as an overly broad application of judicial discretion in interpreting contractual terms.