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09-223 LEVIN V. COMMERCE ENERGY, INC., ET AL. DECISION BELOW:554 F.3d 1094 CERT. GRANTED 11/2/2009 QUESTIONS PRESENTED: 1. Did the Court's decision in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), which addressed the scope of the Tax Injunction Act's bar against federal cases seeking to enjoin the assessment and collection of state taxes, eliminate or narrow the doctrine of comity- applied in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)-which more broadly precludes federal jurisdiction over cases that intrude on the administration of state taxation? 2. Do either comity principles or the Tax Injunction Act bar federal jurisdiction over a case in which taxpayers allege, on equal protection and dormant Commerce Clause grounds, that their tax assessments are discriminatory relative to other taxpayers' assessments? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 08-3410
In the case of Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. Commerce Energy, Inc., et al., 2009, the Supreme Court ruled that state courts have jurisdiction over claims brought under federal law by natural gas marketers against a state tax commissioner. The plaintiffs alleged that Ohio's taxation and regulation of natural gas sales discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and sought injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these laws. However, they had not first pursued their claim through Ohio’s administrative review process before filing suit in federal court as required by comity doctrine (a legal principle encouraging deference between different jurisdictions). The Supreme Court held that this failure violated principles of comity because it bypassed available state remedies without justification or excuse.
In the dissenting opinion for Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. Commerce Energy, Inc., et al., Justice Thomas argued that the majority's decision to allow a federal district court to hear a case challenging state tax law was inconsistent with precedent and undermined states' rights. He contended that the Court had previously established in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary and Hibbs v. Winn that taxpayers are barred from bringing such suits under Section 1983 if they have an adequate remedy at state law - which he believed existed here through Ohio’s administrative process for contesting taxes or seeking refunds followed by judicial review in state courts. Furthermore, he expressed concern about potential negative consequences of allowing federal interference in matters traditionally left to states like taxation policy decisions.