Term: 2012
Docket: 11-1351
Steven Alan Levin, Petitioner v. United States Et Al.
- Pro
11-1351 LEVIN V. UNITED STATES, ET AL. DECISION BELOW: 663 F.3d 1059 ORDER OF OCTOBER 4, 2012: JAMES A. FELDMAN, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D.C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER. CERT. GRANTED 9/25/2012 QUESTION PRESENTED: 10 U.S.C. § 1089 concerns the defense of military medical personnel against claims for tortious acts committed in the scope of employment. It directs that suits may be brought only against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) of the FTCA excludes some suits, including battery, from its waiver. Subsection 1089 (e) states, "For purposes of this section, the provisions of section 2680 (h) ... shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a ... wrongful act ... in the performance of medical ... functions .... " The particular question presented is whether suit may be brought against the United States for battery committed to a civilian by military medical personnel acting within the scope of employment. The broader question raises the same issue for the same and other claims against groups of government employees whose defense would fall under similarly worded statutes. This Court has never addressed these issues. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-16362
The case of Steven Alan Levin v. United States et al., 2012, revolved around the issue of consent in medical malpractice cases involving military personnel. Levin, a veteran who underwent cataract surgery at a U.S. Naval Hospital, claimed that he was not informed about the risks involved with his procedure and suffered complications as a result. He sued for battery - an intentional tort under federal law which does not require proof of negligence but requires lack of consent to be proven by the plaintiff. However, the government argued that such claims were barred by a Supreme Court precedent known as Feres doctrine (Feres v. United States), which prevents military personnel from suing their own government for injuries "incident to service". The lower courts ruled in favor of the government based on this doctrine. Upon appeal to Supreme Court, it held that Feres did not bar Levin's claim because battery is an intentional tort and thus outside its scope; moreover, informed consent is fundamental in healthcare settings regardless if it involves military or civilian patients.
In the dissenting opinion for Steven Alan Levin v. United States et al., Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, argued that consent to medical treatment cannot be equated with consent to negligence. They disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Gonzalez Act (which provides immunity from malpractice suits for military doctors), asserting it does not explicitly state that a patient’s informed consent immunizes negligent care. The dissenters believed this case should have been dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds because no waiver of sovereign immunity exists under federal law for intentional torts committed by government employees, including battery claims against military physicians. They also noted concerns about potential impacts on doctor-patient relationships within the military health system if patients are unable to sue their doctors directly in cases where they believe they were intentionally harmed.
