In Levine v. United States (1965), the Supreme Court ruled on a case involving self-incrimination and the Fifth Amendment. The petitioner, Levine, was summoned to testify before a federal grand jury investigating possible tax evasion. He refused to answer certain questions based on his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination but was granted immunity from prosecution under 18 U.S.C § 2514 and ordered by the court to answer them anyway. When he continued refusing, he was held in contempt of court and sentenced to imprisonment. Levine appealed this decision arguing that since his refusal occurred outside of the courtroom during an investigation rather than during trial proceedings, it did not constitute contempt of court as defined by Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules for Criminal Procedure which requires such behavior occur "in its presence". However, the Supreme Court disagreed with him stating that “presence” within Rule 42(a) includes any act which obstructs judicial administration even if it occurs out-of-court like in grand jury investigations. The ruling thus upheld that individuals who refuse to testify after being granted immunity can be held in contempt because their actions hinder justice system's functioning regardless where they happen.

In the dissenting opinion for Levine v. United States, Justice Harlan argued that the petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was compelled to testify in a civil contempt proceeding without being granted immunity from criminal prosecution. He believed that this case presented an issue of "grave constitutional importance" and criticized the majority for not addressing it directly. Instead, they relied on a technicality - that Levine had failed to claim his privilege against self-incrimination at trial - which Harlan saw as irrelevant since Levine was unaware of his right to do so due to inadequate legal counsel. Furthermore, he contended that even if Levine had claimed this privilege, it would have been denied under existing law thus making its assertion pointless. Therefore, according to Justice Harlan’s dissenting view, compelling testimony in such circumstances constituted coercion incompatible with the principles underlying the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.