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08-974 LEWIS V. CHICAGO DECISION BELOW: 528 F.3d 488 CERT. GRANTED 9/30/2009 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under Title VII, a plaintiff seeking to bring suit for employment discrimination must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred. Where an employer adopts an employment practice that discriminates against African Americans in violation of Title VII's disparate impact provision, must a plaintiff file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or may a plaintiff file a charge within 300 days after the employer's use of the discriminatory practice? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-2052
In the case of Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al. v. City of Chicago, Illinois (2009), a group of African-American firefighter applicants sued the city for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act after they were denied employment due to their scores on an aptitude test used by the city in 1995. The plaintiffs argued that although they filed their lawsuit more than 300 days after receiving notice about their test results - which is beyond Title VII's filing deadline - each time the city hired from its list constituted a new act of discrimination and reset this deadline. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of these applicants, stating that even though it was too late to challenge initial use or adoption of practice (the scoring system), as long as employer continued using such practice resulting into disparate impact, claimants could file suit within statutory period after suffering harm from it.
In the dissenting opinion for Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al. v. City of Chicago, Illinois, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's interpretation of Title VII was incorrect and overly broad in its application to disparate impact claims. He contended that a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination within 300 days after receiving notice of an employer’s decision rather than simply alleging it occurred at some point during their employment history. In his view, this would prevent plaintiffs from bringing stale claims years after alleged discriminatory practices had ceased or been rectified by employers – a situation he believed Congress sought to avoid when drafting Title VII.