Lionberger v. Rouse was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Lionberger, was held in a federal prison in Maryland and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court. The state court issued the writ, but the federal government argued that the state court did not have the authority to do so. The Supreme Court held that the state court did have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right that could not be denied by the federal government. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a necessary part of the judicial system and that the state court had the authority to issue the writ. The Court's decision in Lionberger v. Rouse was an important victory for the rights of prisoners held in federal prisons. The decision established that state courts had the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons, and that the federal government could not deny this right. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it remains an important precedent in the area of prisoner rights.

In Lionberger v. Rouse, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a tenant had a right to remove crops from land that he rented after his lease expired but before the landlord re-entered possession of it. The majority opinion held that since there was no express agreement between the parties allowing for removal of crops, and since such an agreement would be contrary to public policy, the tenant did not have any right to take them away with him. Justice Field dissented on this point and argued that while it is true that tenants do not generally have a legal right to remove their own crops from leased land without permission from their landlords, in this case there were special circumstances which should be taken into consideration when deciding if such removal should be allowed or not. He noted that both parties knew at least two months prior to expiration of the lease term that they would likely part ways upon its termination; thus giving ample time for either party (or both)to make arrangements regarding what could happen with respect to any remaining crop production on said property once tenancy ended. Furthermore, Justice Field arguedthat even though removing these particular crops may go against public policy as established by statute law in some states -which prohibits tenants from taking away anything more than personal effects- ,the fact remains here we are dealing with private contract rights between two individuals who voluntarily entered into an arrangement whereby one agreed rent out his land while other agreed pay money in exchange for use thereof; therefore making it reasonable under those conditions for tenant retain whatever fruits labor produced during period occupancy regardless whether expressed written form or otherwise