In Lippincott v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The case arose when the plaintiff, Lippincott, sought to have a writ of mandamus issued by the state court of Pennsylvania to the federal court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The writ of mandamus was sought in order to compel the federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the defendant, Mitchell, who was being held in custody by the United States Marshal. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the federal court. The Court reasoned that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the federal court, and that the writ of mandamus was an extraordinary remedy that could only be issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court further held that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court could not issue a writ of mandamus to compel the federal court to issue the writ. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court of Pennsylvania did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the federal court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Court reasoned that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the federal court, and that the writ of mandamus was an extraordinary remedy that could only be issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In the case of Lippincott v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a contract between two parties could be enforced when one party had not received any consideration for their part in it. The majority opinion held that since no consideration had been given to either side, the contract was unenforceable and thus void. However, Justice Field dissented from this ruling on several grounds. He argued that while there may have been no actual payment or exchange of goods involved in this particular agreement, both sides did receive something valuable: namely an assurance that each would fulfill their respective obligations under the terms of the contract. Furthermore, he noted that such contracts were often made without any form of compensation being exchanged and yet they were still legally binding due to mutual trust and reliance upon each other's promises; therefore he felt it should be up to a jury to decide if such an arrangement existed here as well rather than having it automatically declared invalid by judicial decree alone