Little & Others v. Giles & Another was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The case arose when the plaintiffs, Little & Others, filed a petition in a state court in Georgia seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants, Giles & Another, to appear in a federal court in Alabama. The state court granted the petition and issued the writ. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the state court had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the state court lacked the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court reasoned that the state court was not a part of the federal court system and thus did not have the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court further held that the writ of mandamus was an extraordinary remedy and should only be issued by a court with the authority to do so. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court lacked the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court reasoned that the state court was not a part of the federal court system and thus did not have the power to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal court. The Court further held that the writ of mandamus was an extraordinary remedy and should only be issued by a court with the authority to do so.

In Little & Others v. Giles & Another, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a deed of trust executed by two individuals in 1867 could be enforced against their heirs and assigns. The majority opinion held that the deed of trust was valid and enforceable against all parties involved, including those who were not named in it at the time of its execution. Justice Field dissented from this decision on the grounds that such an interpretation would allow for contracts to bind people without their knowledge or consent, which he argued violated basic principles of fairness and justice. He further noted that if such a rule were adopted then any contract made between two persons could potentially bind third parties without them ever having had notice or opportunity to object before it became binding upon them. In conclusion, Justice Field maintained his belief that only those who are actually named as parties in a contract should be bound by its terms unless they have expressly consented otherwise after being informed about what is contained within it.