Term: 2008
Docket: 07-610
Daniel B. Locke, Et Al. v. Edward A. Karass, State Controller, Et Al.
- Pro
07-610 LOCKE V. KARASS DECISION BELOW: 498 F 3d 49 CERT. GRANTED 2/19/2008 QUESTION PRESENTED: In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, this Court unanimously “determined that the [Railway Labor Act], as informed by the First Amendment, prohibits the use of dissenters’ [union] fees for extraunit litigation.” Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991) (opinion of Blackmun, J., citing Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)). In Lehnert, a four- member plurality therefore held “that the Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public sector.” Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion, concurring in part in the judgment announced by Justice Blackmun, reasoned that “there is good reason to treat [Ellis and the Court’s other statutory cases] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule.” Id. at 555. May a State, nonetheless, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees for purposes of financing a monopoly bargaining agent’s affiliates’ litigation outside of a nonunion employee’s bargaining unit? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-1747
In the case of Daniel B. Locke, et al. v. Edward A. Karass, State Controller, et al., 2008, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a public-sector union could charge non-members for national litigation expenses as long as they are related to collective bargaining activities and not political or ideological in nature. The plaintiffs were non-union members who objected to being charged fees by their local union which included costs incurred by its national affiliate for nationwide litigation services that did not directly benefit them or their bargaining unit but was used elsewhere across the country on behalf of other units represented by the same parent organization. They argued this violated their First Amendment rights against compelled speech and association since it forced them to financially support causes with which they may disagree without providing direct benefits in return. The court held these charges permissible under its precedent set forth in Lehnert v Ferris Faculty Association (1991), where it allowed unions to charge nonmembers only for expenditures germane to collective-bargaining activity; provided those charges do not significantly add to burdening free speech; and if there is an appropriate procedure that adequately protects objectors' rights.
In the dissenting opinion for Locke v. Karass, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that the majority's decision to allow a public-sector union to charge non-members for national litigation expenses was inconsistent with previous rulings and violated the First Amendment rights of non-union members. They contended that only those costs directly related to collective bargaining should be charged to non-members as agency fees. The dissenters believed that charging nonmembers for litigation not concerning their specific unit amounted to compelled speech and association, which is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. They also criticized the majority's "germaneness" test as vague and subjective because it allowed unions too much discretion in determining what constitutes a chargeable expense.
