In the case of Lopinson v. Pennsylvania (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a conviction for murder in the first degree, where it was alleged that there had been an infringement on constitutional rights due to police misconduct during interrogation and confession procedures. The defendant, Lopinson, claimed his confessions were coerced by police through physical abuse and denial of counsel which violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to legal representation. However, after reviewing the record from state court proceedings including testimonies about treatment while in custody as well as timing of access to counsel, the Supreme Court found no evidence supporting these allegations or any constitutional violations warranting reversal of conviction under federal law standards established by previous cases like Miranda v Arizona.

In the dissenting opinion for Lopinson v. Pennsylvania, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the majority's decision to uphold a conviction based on evidence obtained through electronic surveillance was an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. He contended that wiretapping is inherently invasive and should be considered unconstitutional unless there is a warrant issued by a judge based on probable cause, as required by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, he criticized the Court's reliance on Katz v. United States in their ruling because it did not directly address whether or not wiretapping without a warrant was constitutional but rather focused on privacy expectations in public spaces which he believed were irrelevant to this case.