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Loring v. Frue is a United States Supreme Court case that was decided in 1881. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a steamboat. The plaintiff, Loring, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Frue, to purchase a steamboat for $2,000. Loring paid Frue the full amount, but Frue refused to deliver the steamboat. Loring then sued Frue for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that Frue was liable for breach of contract. The Court found that the contract between the parties was valid and enforceable, and that Frue had breached the contract by failing to deliver the steamboat. The Court also held that Loring was entitled to damages for the breach of contract. The Court awarded Loring the full amount of the purchase price, plus interest, as damages for the breach. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that Frue was liable for breach of contract and awarded Loring the full amount of the purchase price, plus interest, as damages for the breach.
In the case of Loring v. Frue, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had incorrectly interpreted the language of an 1864 contract between two parties. He noted that while it was true that one party had agreed to pay for certain services rendered by another, this did not necessarily mean they were liable for all costs associated with those services. Instead, Justice Field argued that only those costs specifically mentioned in the agreement should be considered as part of any payment due from one party to another. Furthermore, he stated that if there were any ambiguities or uncertainties regarding what constituted “costs” under such an agreement then these should be resolved through interpretation and construction rather than simply assuming liability on behalf of either side without further consideration or analysis. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting his disagreement with how the majority had handled this particular case and expressed hope for more clarity when interpreting similar contracts in future cases.