In the 1998 case of Louis Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal kidnapping statute could not be applied if the crime did not substantially affect interstate commerce. The defendant, Louis Jones Jr., had been convicted under this statute for abducting and murdering a fellow soldier's wife from an army base in Texas. His lawyers argued that since both he and his victim were residents of Texas at the time of her abduction, there was no substantial effect on interstate commerce to justify applying federal law rather than state law. In a unanimous decision, the court agreed with this argument and overturned Jones' conviction.

In the dissenting opinion for Louis Jones v. United States, Justice Scalia argued that the federal government had overstepped its bounds by prosecuting a crime that occurred within a state's jurisdiction. He contended that the Constitution only grants Congress power to regulate interstate commerce and not crimes committed on local property solely because it is owned or leased by the federal government. The murder in this case took place on an army base, which was federally owned but located within Texas' borders; therefore, he believed it should have been prosecuted under Texas law rather than federal law. Furthermore, he criticized his colleagues for their broad interpretation of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause as it could potentially allow Congress to prosecute any crime occurring anywhere in America simply because all criminal activity can affect interstate commerce indirectly.