Term: 2015
Docket: 14-419
Luis v. United States
- Pro
14-419 LUIS V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 564 Fed.Appx. 493 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 13-13719 CERT. GRANTED 6/8/2015 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case presents an opportunity for the Court to resolve a circuit split on a question of fundamental importance to the adversarial system of justice: whether the restraint of untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Last Term, this Court reaffirmed that tainted assets may be restrained pre-trial (and forfeited upon conviction), even when those assets are needed to retain counsel of choice. Kaley v. United States, _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1105 (2014); accord United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 631 (1989). In rejecting constitutional challenges to pretrial restraints under 21 U.S.C. § 853, it was significant to this Court that the restrained assets were tainted, i.e., traceable to the alleged criminal conduct. See, e.g., Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1095 (noting that "no one contests that the assets in question derive from, or were used in committing, the offenses"). Although the Solicitor General and three Justices appeared to agree that the restraint of untainted assets would pose constitutional problems, see id. at 1095 n.3; id. at 1108 & n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), the majority opinion in Kaley "[did] not opine on the matter." Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1095 n.3. The Fourth Circuit has expressly held that "[w]hile Caplin [& Drysdale, Chtd.] made absolutely clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right for a defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds, [a defendant] still possesses a qualified Sixth Amendment right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire the attorney of his choice." United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 2001). Addressing a pretrial restraint under 18 U.S.C. § 1345, the Eleventh Circuit in this case upheld a preliminary injunction that currently restrains all of petitioner's assets, including undisputedly untainted funds needed by her to engage private counsel in her criminal case. Ignoring the Fourth Circuit's holding in Farmer and the important and historical distinction between tainted and untainted assets, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Kaley, Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. to "foreclose" petitioner's constitutional challenge to the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted funds she needs to retain counsel of choice. United States v. Luis, No. 13-13719, 564 F. App'x. 493, 494 (11th Cir. 2014). Given the conflict between the circuits on a constitutional issue significant to criminal defendants, the criminal defense bar and the administration of justice, this petition presents the following question for certiorari review: Whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant's legitimate, untainted assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
In the case of Luis v. United States, 2015, Sila Luis was indicted on charges related to Medicare fraud amounting to approximately $45 million. The government sought a pretrial order that would prevent her from using her own untainted funds (not connected with the alleged crime) for legal defense fees. This raised an issue regarding the Sixth Amendment which guarantees a defendant's right to counsel of their choice. In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Luis stating that freezing assets not directly linked with criminal activities before trial violates this constitutional right as it effectively denies defendants' ability to secure counsel of their choice and undermines their ability to defend themselves adequately.
In the dissenting opinion for Luis v. United States, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with precedent and could potentially undermine important governmental interests. They contended that there is no constitutional difference between tainted assets (those directly linked to criminal activity) and untainted assets (those not directly linked). The dissenters believed this distinction would create practical problems in implementing asset freezes because it can be difficult to trace which funds are derived from illegal activities. Furthermore, they expressed concern about potential harm to victims of fraud who might not be able to recover their losses if defendants were allowed unrestricted access to their assets before trial. In essence, they disagreed with the majority’s view that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to use innocent funds needed for living expenses or legal fees when those same resources may be required later for restitution or penalties.
