In the case of Maass, Executor v. Higgins, Collector of Internal Revenue in 1940, the U.S Supreme Court was asked to decide on a tax dispute involving estate taxes. The executor of an estate argued that certain securities should not be included in the gross estate for taxation purposes because they were transferred by the deceased prior to death and thus fell outside federal jurisdiction. However, under Section 302(c) of the Revenue Act (1926), any transfer made without adequate consideration where possession or enjoyment can only be obtained after death is deemed part of a decedent's gross estate for tax purposes. The court ruled against Maass stating that even though legal title had been transferred before death, actual possession and enjoyment remained with the deceased until his demise which brought it within purview of Section 302(c). Therefore, these securities were subject to inclusion in calculating federal estate taxes.

In the dissenting opinion for Maass v. Higgins, Justice Frankfurter argued that the majority misinterpreted Section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926. He believed that this section was not intended to provide a tax exemption for all transfers made in contemplation of death but rather only those where there is an intention to evade taxes by making gifts shortly before death. According to him, Congress did not intend to exempt from taxation any transfer made within two years prior to death unless it could be shown that such transfer was not motivated by anticipation of impending demise and hence should be treated as a gift inter vivos (during life). The justice also criticized the majority's reliance on previous court decisions which he considered irrelevant or wrongly decided. In his view, these cases were based on different statutory provisions and factual circumstances and therefore provided no guidance in interpreting Section 302(c).