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The U.S. Supreme Court case Macauley, Acting Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, et al. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 1945 involved a dispute over the sale of surplus war-built ships after World War II by the U.S. Maritime Commission to private companies under Section 9 of the Merchant Marine Act (1936). The Waterman Steamship Corporation challenged this action on grounds that it violated their rights under due process clause and non-delegation doctrine as they were not given an opportunity for a hearing before their bid was rejected and because Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the commission without clear standards or guidelines. However, in a unanimous decision led by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the court upheld that such sales did not require hearings since they were executive actions rather than rule-making ones which would have required public participation according to Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Furthermore, it held that delegation was constitutional as long as there is an intelligible principle guiding administrative discretion - which in this case was found in national defense considerations outlined within Merchant Marine Act.
The dissenting opinion in the case of Macauley v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 1945, argued that the majority's decision to uphold a ruling by the United States Maritime Commission was incorrect. The dissenters believed that the commission had overstepped its authority when it decided to withhold payment from Waterman Steamship Corporation for services rendered during World War II. They contended that this action violated due process and amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's assertion that judicial review of such decisions should be limited because they involved matters of national security or foreign policy discretion. Instead, they maintained that courts have both a right and duty to ensure administrative agencies do not exceed their statutory powers or infringe upon constitutional rights.