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In the case of Maleng, King County Prosecuting Attorney, et al. v. Cook (1988), the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a prisoner's habeas corpus petition was not "in custody" under an expired sentence and therefore could not challenge it in federal court. The respondent, John Leland Cook had been convicted for two separate crimes in Washington state courts and received consecutive sentences for each crime. While serving his first sentence he filed a habeas corpus petition challenging both convictions but by the time his case reached federal court he had already completed his first sentence and begun serving his second one. The District Court dismissed Cook’s claim regarding the first conviction stating that since he was no longer 'in custody' for this offense when filing, they lacked jurisdiction to hear it as per 28 U.S.C §2254(a). This decision was upheld by Ninth Circuit on appeal but reversed by Supreme Court which held that while petitioner is still 'in custody' under consecutive sentences imposed at same time, once petitioner finishes serving sentence being challenged before filing habeas application then there is no jurisdiction to entertain such claims.
In the dissenting opinion for Maleng, King County Prosecuting Attorney, et al. v. Cook (1988), Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "in custody" under federal habeas corpus statute 28 U.S.C §2254(a). He argued that a prisoner who is serving consecutive sentences remains in custody under any sentence until all are served. Therefore, he believed that Cook was still 'in custody' for his expired Washington State sentence because it affected the start date and duration of his subsequent federal sentence. According to him, this made Cook eligible to challenge his state conviction through a habeas petition even though he had finished serving time specifically assigned for it but was still incarcerated due to another related charge. The majority’s decision not only contradicted precedent but also undermined prisoners’ ability to challenge unlawful convictions and sentences.