In the case of Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 1988, attorney Charles D. Mallard was ordered by a federal district court to represent indigent defendants in a civil lawsuit pro bono (without charge). He appealed this decision on the grounds that it violated his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment and statutory law. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mallard, stating that federal courts do not have authority to compel attorneys appointed under 28 U.S.C §1915(d) to serve without their consent. This ruling clarified that while lawyers have an ethical obligation to assist those unable to afford legal representation, they cannot be legally forced into involuntary servitude or uncompensated work.

In the dissenting opinion for Mallard v. U.S. District Court, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's interpretation of 28 U.S.C Section 1915(d) was too narrow and failed to consider its historical context and purpose. He pointed out that this statute has been used since the late nineteenth century to authorize courts to request attorneys' services on behalf of indigent litigants, not just in criminal cases but also in civil ones where fundamental rights were at stake. The justice believed that such a practice is consistent with an attorney’s professional responsibility towards society and does not constitute involuntary servitude as claimed by others. Furthermore, he noted that limiting court-ordered representation could potentially undermine access to justice for poor individuals who cannot afford legal assistance.