In the 1963 case Malloy v. Hogan, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination is applicable to state court proceedings through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The petitioner, William Malloy, was convicted of a gambling offense in Connecticut and later called before a referee to answer questions about his involvement in illegal gambling activities. He refused to answer on grounds that he might incriminate himself but was subsequently jailed for contempt of court because Connecticut law did not recognize his right against self-incrimination under its own constitution or laws at that time. In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court extended federal constitutional protections to defendants in state courts and held that no person can be compelled in any criminal case "to be a witness against himself" regardless of whether it is federally or locally prosecuted.

In the dissenting opinion for Malloy v. Hogan, Justice John Marshall Harlan II argued that the majority's decision to apply federal Fifth Amendment standards to state court proceedings was a departure from established precedent and an overextension of judicial power. He contended that this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause effectively imposed uniformity on states' criminal procedures, undermining their sovereignty and flexibility in managing their own legal systems. Furthermore, he expressed concerns about potential negative impacts on law enforcement efforts due to increased restrictions on interrogation practices. Lastly, he criticized the majority's reliance on "natural law" theory as a basis for constitutional interpretation instead of adhering strictly to its text and historical context.