The Manson v. Brathwaite case in 1976 involved the issue of eyewitness identification and its reliability under the Due Process Clause. The defendant, Robert Brathwaite, was convicted for selling heroin to an undercover police officer based on a single-eyewitness identification procedure which he claimed was suggestive and unreliable. He argued that this violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause because it created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. However, the Supreme Court ruled against him in a 5-4 decision stating that even if an identification procedure is suggestive, it does not violate due process as long as it is reliable considering all circumstances such as witness’s opportunity to view criminal at time of crime; witness’s degree of attention; accuracy of prior description given by witness etc., thus establishing new guidelines for lower courts when dealing with issues related to eyewitness identifications.

In the dissenting opinion for Manson v. Brathwaite, Justice Marshall argued that a stricter standard should be applied to determine the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. He believed that any identification procedure deemed unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identity should automatically render such evidence inadmissible, regardless of its reliability under other circumstances. This view was based on concerns about the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications and their potential for causing wrongful convictions. Justice Marshall also expressed concern over racial bias influencing cross-racial identifications, as this case involved a black suspect being identified by a white officer. He feared that not enforcing strict standards could perpetuate systemic racism within law enforcement and judicial processes.