Term: 2012
Docket: 12-25
Edward F. Maracich, Et Al., Petitioners v. Michael Eugene Spears Et Al.
- Pro
12-25 MARACICH V. SPEARS DECISION BELOW: 675 F.3d 281 CERT. GRANTED 9/25/2012 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, prohibits the obtainment, use, or disclosure of "personal information" maintained in state motor vehicle department ("DMV") databases, unless the use of such information falls within one of several discrete enumerated exceptions. This case presents an opportunity for this Court to resolve a conflict among the circuits and even state courts as to the circumstances under which the litigation exception to the Act permits lawyers special rights of access to DPPA- protected information. In this case, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to hold that the acquisition and use by lawyers of confidential information from a DPPA-protected database solely for the purpose of soliciting clients, as opposed to searching for evidence or witnesses, qualified as a use "in connection with" litigation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). The Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on the other hand, have held that the litigation exception does not permit lawyers to obtain or use DPPA-protected information to find or solicit clients. Instead, these courts have made clear that the litigation exception permits use of private information only when the information is relevant or likely to lead to discovery of evidence or witnesses. The Fourth Circuit has crossed that line, thereby inserting into the DPPA what amounts to a "for use by lawyers" exception, as opposed to a "for use in litigation" exception, and further muddling an already confusing and conflicted area of the law. This petition asks the Court to consider two questions: 1.Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to every other court heretofore to have considered the issue, that lawyers who obtain, disclose, or use personal information solely to find clients to represent in an incipient lawsuit -as opposed to evidence for use in existing or potential litigation -may seek solace under the litigation exception of the Act. 2.Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in reaching the conclusion (in conflict with prior precedent) that a lawyer who files an action that effectively amounts to a "place holder" lawsuit may thereafter use DPPA-protected personal information to solicit plaintiffs for that action through a direct mail advertising campaign on the grounds that such use is "inextricably intertwined" with "use in litigation." LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 10-2021
The case of Edward F. Maracich v. Michael Eugene Spears et al., 2012, revolved around the interpretation and application of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). The respondents, a group of lawyers, had used personal information from South Carolina’s Department of Motor Vehicles to send direct mailers to potential clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships. The petitioners argued that this was an invasion of privacy and violation under DPPA which prohibits obtaining or disclosing personal information from motor vehicle records for marketing purposes without consent. However, the respondents claimed their actions were permissible under one exception in DPPA allowing such use "in connection with any civil... legal proceeding." In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of Maracich stating that while solicitation could be considered part-and-parcel with litigation activities generally speaking; it did not fall within this specific exemption as intended by Congress when drafting DPPA.
In the dissenting opinion for Edward F. Maracich, et al., Petitioners v. Michael Eugene Spears et al., Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's interpretation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) was too narrow and failed to consider its broader purpose: to protect driver privacy from invasive practices by businesses and marketers. She contended that lawyers should not be exempted from this law simply because they are conducting litigation-related activities, as their actions can still violate drivers' privacy rights in a way that Congress intended to prevent when it enacted DPPA. Furthermore, she pointed out inconsistencies in how different types of solicitations were treated under the majority's ruling; while direct marketing solicitation was prohibited under DPPA, solicitation for legal services was allowed even though both could potentially infringe upon individual privacy rights equally.
