The U.S. Supreme Court case Marine Transit Corp. et al. v. Dreyfus et al., 1931, revolved around a dispute over the interpretation of the Harter Act, which regulates maritime commerce in U.S waters and between U.S ports and foreign ports. The plaintiffs, Marine Transit Corporation and others (ship owners), had chartered their vessels to the defendants, Dreyfus & Co., for transporting grain from Argentina to Europe during World War I when there was a high risk of enemy action at sea. When some ships were lost or damaged due to war perils despite taking precautions as agreed upon in charter parties (contracts), ship owners sought compensation from charterers arguing that they should be held responsible under certain clauses of the Harter Act exempting them from liability only if they exercised due diligence before and at beginning of each voyage to make ships seaworthy but not throughout voyages' duration. However, defendants contended that these clauses did not apply because risks involved were extraordinary wartime ones beyond normal scope covered by act's provisions requiring shipowners' continuous duty regarding seaworthiness after voyages commenced. The Supreme Court sided with defendants holding that such an expansive reading would distort act's intent while noting it aimed primarily at protecting shippers against negligence rather than insulating them completely against all losses arising out any causes whatsoever once journeys began.

In the dissenting opinion for Marine Transit Corp. et al. v. Dreyfus et al., Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision to uphold a state law requiring foreign corporations to consent to service of process as a condition of doing business in New York was inconsistent with previous rulings and violated due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He contended that this requirement placed an undue burden on interstate commerce, arguing that it effectively forced foreign corporations to surrender their constitutional right not be sued in states where they are not present or do not have property just because they engage in interstate commerce there. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's assertion that such laws were necessary for states to protect their citizens from unscrupulous businesses, stating instead these laws could potentially lead to abuse by allowing suits against companies without sufficient connection or presence within a particular state.