| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

In the case of Marlin v. Lewallen, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1927 that a Tennessee law which allowed for the seizure and sale of an automobile used to transport illegal alcohol did not violate due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff, Marlin, argued that his car was unlawfully seized by state officials after he had loaned it to another individual who then used it for transporting illicit liquor without his knowledge or consent. He contended this constituted deprivation of property without due process of law as he was innocent owner unaware about its use in crime. However, the court held that since public welfare is at stake with respect to prohibition laws and their enforcement, such forfeiture statutes are constitutional even if they may affect innocent parties adversely on occasion.
In the dissenting opinion for Marlin v. Lewallen, Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings of the court and violated principles of federalism. He contended that states should have authority to regulate their own internal affairs without interference from federal courts, including matters related to property rights and contractual obligations. In this case, he believed Tennessee had a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from predatory lending practices by out-of-state corporations like Marlin Firearms Company. Therefore, he disagreed with the majority's view that Tennessee’s law limiting foreign corporations' ability to enforce contracts was unconstitutional under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment because it deprived them of property without due process of law.