In Robert Marshall v. Susan G. Beall, the Supreme Court of the United States heard a case involving an alleged breach of contract between two parties in which one party was seeking damages for non-performance by the other party. The appellant, Robert Marshall, had entered into a contract with defendant Susan G. Beall to purchase certain real estate from her and pay $1,000 as consideration for it; however, he failed to make payment on time and thus breached his contractual obligation under the agreement. In response to this breach of contract by Marshall, Beall refused to transfer title or possession of said property over to him despite having accepted his money as part payment towards its purchase price; instead she sought compensation from him for any losses incurred due to his failure in performing his obligations under their agreement. The court ultimately found that while there was no express provision within their contract regarding damages resulting from such breaches nor did either party have knowledge at time they made it that such would be necessary should one fail in fulfilling their duties therein - nevertheless since both parties were aware that some form of recompense may be required if either defaulted on performance then they could not deny each other's right thereto when circumstances arose necessitating same being awarded accordingly given all facts presented before them during trial proceedings leading up thereto..

In the case of Robert Marshall v. Susan G. Beall, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a deed given by Marshall to Beall should be enforced as written or if it should be reformed due to mutual mistake in its execution. The majority opinion held that because there was no evidence of fraud or undue influence, and since both parties were competent adults at the time of signing, then they must abide by their agreement as written. However, Justice McLean dissented from this decision on two grounds: firstly that although there may have been no fraud present in this case, he felt that equity demanded some form of relief for Marshall; secondly he argued that even though both parties had signed willingly and without coercion at the time of execution, it could not be denied that an error had occurred which led them into making a contract neither party intended when entering into it. Therefore Justice McLean concluded his dissent with a call for reform rather than enforcement so justice would prevail over technicalities in such cases where clear mistakes are made but still legally binding contracts are formed between two consenting individuals