In the 1916 case of Marshall v. Gordon, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether Congress had overstepped its bounds in punishing a private citizen for contempt. The House of Representatives had ordered its Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest New York attorney Myron T. Marshall after he sent a letter criticizing President Woodrow Wilson and accusing members of Congress of corruption and treasonous behavior during World War I negotiations with Germany. The court ruled that while each house has an inherent right to punish for contempt as part of self-preservation, this power is limited to cases where it is necessary or appropriate in order for them to perform their constitutional duties effectively; it does not extend indefinitely into actions outside these boundaries which may be deemed offensive by members. In this instance, they found that Mr.Marshall's conduct did not pose such threat or obstruction warranting punishment by the legislative body.

In the dissenting opinion for Marshall v. Gordon, Justice Holmes disagreed with the majority's interpretation of legislative privilege and its application to this case. He argued that while Congress has a right to protect itself from disruption, it does not have unlimited power to punish individuals for contempt outside of its immediate vicinity or session times. In his view, the punishment inflicted on Mr. Marshall was disproportionate and beyond what was necessary for self-protection; therefore it should be considered as an unlawful act rather than a privileged one under Article I Section 6 of the Constitution which provides immunity from arrest during attendance at sessions of their respective Houses except in cases such as treason, felony or breach of peace. Furthermore, he contended that by affirming Congressional authority over actions occurring outside its premises and time frame without clear boundaries could potentially lead to abuse of power.