Martin v. Thompson was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The case arose when a prisoner, Martin, was convicted in a federal court and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Martin then sought a writ of habeas corpus from a state court, arguing that his conviction was invalid. The state court granted the writ and ordered Martin released from prison. The United States Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with a federal court's judgment. The Court further held that the state court's action was an unconstitutional interference with the federal court's jurisdiction. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with a federal court's judgment. The Court further held that the state court's action was an unconstitutional interference with the federal court's jurisdiction.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Martin v. Thompson, arguing that the majority’s decision was wrongfully based on a misapplication of law and precedent. He argued that under existing laws, an individual who had been convicted of a crime could not be held liable for damages resulting from their actions if they were pardoned by the governor before being sentenced to prison or paying any fines associated with their conviction. In this case, he noted that although Martin had been found guilty of assault and battery against Thompson, he was subsequently granted a full pardon by Governor Gordon prior to sentencing or payment of any fines; thus his conviction should have no bearing on whether he is liable for damages caused by his actions as it would be considered nullified due to the pardon. Justice Field concluded his dissent noting that while there may have been some legal basis for holding Martin accountable despite receiving a pardon, none existed in this particular case given its facts and circumstances.