In the 1965 case Maryland for the Use of Levin et al. v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute over land ownership between private parties and the federal government. The state of Maryland had sold land to private individuals who later discovered that part of their property was being used by a U.S military installation without their consent or compensation. They sued for trespassing and sought damages from the federal government under an old English common law doctrine known as "informations in nature of quo warranto." However, this doctrine only allows states to sue on behalf of its citizens when it has suffered direct harm itself. The Supreme Court held that Maryland could not bring such a suit because it had no proprietary interest or sovereign control over lands purchased from it once they have been incorporated into Federal enclaves with consent given by State's legislature pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 (Enclave Clause)of Constitution; hence suffering no injury within meaning of said doctrine. Therefore, while acknowledging that these individuals may have legitimate grievances against federal encroachment onto their property rights,the court ultimately dismissed their claims due to lack procedural standing through state action under aforementioned legal principle.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Maryland for the Use of Levin et al. v. United States argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established principles and precedent regarding sovereign immunity, which traditionally protects states from lawsuits without their consent. The dissenters believed that this principle should extend to suits brought by foreign nations as well, not just those initiated by private individuals or other states. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of an 1885 law allowing foreign governments to sue in U.S courts, arguing it did not intend to waive state sovereign immunity but rather only granted such governments access to federal courts on equal footing with private litigants. Furthermore, they contended that if Congress intended such a significant alteration of traditional concepts of sovereignty and federalism, it would have done so explicitly rather than implicitly through ambiguous legislation.