Term: 2005
Docket: 04-373
Maryland v. Leeander Jerome Blake
- Pro
04-373 MARYLAND V. BLAKE DECISION BELOW: 849 A2d 410 DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 4/18/2005 QUESTION PRESENTED: Leeander Blake was arrested on October 26, 2002, and charged with the first degree murder of Straughan Lee Griffin. At the police station, Blake invoked his right to counsel after being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The police immediately ceased questioning and placed Blake in a holding cell. Thirty-five minutes later, Detective William Johns went to Blake's cell, gave him a copy of his arrest warrant and charging papers, and told Blake to read them carefully. Officer Curtis Reese, a patrol officer, walked with Detective Johns to the cell, and, after the paperwork was handed to Blake, said, "I bet you want to talk now, huh." Detective Johns shoved Officer Reese from the room, telling him that Blake had asked for an attorney and they could not talk to him. Approximately 30 minutes later when Detective Johns brought Blake some clothes, Blake asked, "I can still talk to you?" The detective confirmed that Blake wanted to talk to him, readvised him of his Miranda rights, and obtained Blake's waiver of his right to counsel. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there had been a violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The question presented is: When a police officer improperly communicates with a suspect after invocation of the suspect's right to counsel, does Edwards permit consideration of curative measures by the police, or other intervening circumstances, to conclude that a suspect later initiated communication with the police? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 81, September Term, 2003
In the case of Maryland v. Leeander Jerome Blake, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a matter related to the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. The defendant, Leeander Blake, was initially charged with both first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery in Maryland state court but had his charges dismissed due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial under Maryland law. Prosecutors then sought and obtained an indictment for these same charges from federal authorities based on their jurisdiction over crimes committed during drug trafficking offenses (Blake allegedly killed while attempting to rob a known drug dealer). However, Blake argued that this amounted to double jeopardy - being tried twice for the same crime - which is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed with Blake's argument because he had not been "put in jeopardy" at all in state court; rather than going through trial proceedings there, his charges were simply dismissed before any such process could begin. Therefore, according to this ruling by Justice Antonin Scalia writing for unanimous court decision (9-0), trying him again at federal level did not violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
In the dissenting opinion for Maryland v. Leeander Jerome Blake, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. She argued that Blake should not be retried because his initial trial was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, which she believed constituted an acquittal under the double jeopardy clause. In her view, allowing a second trial would undermine protections against being tried twice for the same crime and could encourage prosecutors to seek dismissals when their cases are going poorly in order to get a "second bite at the apple." Furthermore, she noted that there were other remedies available if prosecutorial or judicial error led to dismissal of charges such as professional discipline or appeal by prosecution.
