Maryland v. Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr.

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 26 Jan 2009

Is the Edwards v. Arizona prohibition against interrogation of a suspect who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel inapplicable if, after the suspect asks for counsel, there is a break in custody or a substantial lapse in time (more than two years and six months) before commencing reinterrogation pursuant to Miranda?

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

In the case of Maryland v. Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr., the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a break in custody could allow for re-interrogation after an individual has invoked their Miranda rights. In 2003, Shatzer was imprisoned for a separate crime when police attempted to question him about allegations that he sexually abused his son. He declined to speak without an attorney present and the investigation ceased. Nearly three years later, another officer reopened the case and interrogated Shatzer who waived his rights and made incriminating statements leading to conviction on sexual child abuse charges. Shatzer appealed arguing that Edwards v Arizona (1981) prohibited further interrogation after requesting counsel unless initiated by defendant himself which wasn't followed here as there was no break in 'custody'. The court ruled against him stating that being released back into general prison population constituted a break in custody allowing renewed attempts at interrogation if sufficient time had passed - determined as 14 days or more.

Dissent summary

Etalia.ai summary of the dissenting opinions

In the dissenting opinion for Maryland v. Shatzer, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision to create a 14-day rule was arbitrary and unsupported by empirical evidence or logical reasoning. He contended that there is no reason to believe that after two weeks in prison, an inmate would feel less coerced into waiving his Miranda rights than he might have felt immediately after arrest. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on Edwards v. Arizona as precedent for their ruling because it did not involve a similar situation of re-interrogation after a significant lapse of time. Instead of creating an arbitrary time limit, Justice Stevens suggested that courts should consider all relevant circumstances when determining whether a suspect has been subjected to improper coercion during police questioning.

Opinion written by Justice Scalia

Decided 24 Feb 2010 · Official report

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Oral argument transcript

Argued 5 Oct 2009