In the case of Mascot Oil Company, Incorporated v. United States (1930), the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the U.S. government regarding a dispute over oil import duties. The Mascot Oil Company had imported heavy fuel oil from Mexico and argued that it should be classified under paragraph 150 of the Tariff Act as "crude petroleum," which would result in lower tariffs than if it were classified as refined petroleum products under paragraph 151. However, because this particular type of oil underwent a refining process before being exported to America, despite not being fully refined into gasoline or other end-products, the court decided that it fell under paragraph 151's classification for partially refined oils rather than crude petroleum. Therefore, they upheld higher tariff rates on these imports.

In the dissenting opinion for Mascot Oil Company, Inc. v. United States, Justice Stone argued that the majority's interpretation of Section 4 of the Leasing Act was incorrect and overly broad. He believed that this section did not grant authority to cancel oil leases in all circumstances but only when there had been a violation of law or regulation by the lessee. In his view, if Congress intended to give such sweeping powers to administrative officers as those exercised here - namely cancelling a lease without any misconduct on part of lessees - it would have done so explicitly rather than implicitly through vague language in an unrelated provision about penalties for violations. Furthermore, he pointed out inconsistencies between this decision and previous court rulings which upheld property rights against arbitrary government action without due process.