In the 1990 case Jeffrey M. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., and Janet Malcolm, psychoanalyst Jeffrey M. Masson sued these entities for libel after journalist Janet Malcolm wrote an article and a book portraying him in a negative light by using quotes that he claimed were fabricated or altered significantly from what he actually said during their interviews together. The defendants argued that they had not committed libel because any alterations to his words did not materially change the meaning of what was expressed - essentially arguing that even if some words were changed or invented, they still captured the "rational interpretation" of his sentiments accurately enough to avoid being considered false representation under defamation law standards at the time (which required proving both falsity and harm). However, this argument was rejected by Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy who stated that if a writer alters a speaker's words but effects no material change in meaning (including implications), liability may be avoided; but where alteration results in material changes – whether factual or tonal – then it is potentially actionable as defamation.

In the dissenting opinion for Jeffrey M. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., and Janet Malcolm, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the majority's decision to allow a libel case based on quotations that were not verbatim but captured the "substance or gist" of what was said would have chilling effects on free speech and press freedom. He contended that this standard was too subjective and could lead to self-censorship by journalists fearing potential litigation over their paraphrasing choices. Furthermore, he believed it contradicted previous court rulings requiring actual malice in defamation cases involving public figures - knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for truth - as it allowed suits based merely on inaccurate reporting rather than intentional deceit.