The Mayor v. Cooper was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1867. The case involved a dispute between the mayor of the City of Washington, D.C. and a man named Cooper. Cooper had been arrested for disorderly conduct and was being held in jail without bail. The mayor argued that Cooper should be released on bail, while Cooper argued that he should be released without bail. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Cooper, ruling that the mayor had no authority to deny bail to a person who had been arrested for a minor offense. The Court held that the mayor had violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Court also held that the mayor had violated the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive bail. The Court's decision in The Mayor v. Cooper established an important precedent in the area of criminal procedure. It established that the government must provide due process of law to all persons accused of a crime, regardless of the severity of the offense. It also established that the government must not impose excessive bail on those accused of minor offenses. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and it continues to be an important part of the criminal justice system today.

In the case of The Mayor v. Cooper, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a municipal ordinance that prohibited African Americans from living within city limits violated the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In an 8-1 decision, Chief Justice Chase wrote for the majority opinion that such ordinances were unconstitutional and therefore void. However, in his dissenting opinion Justice Miller argued that while he agreed with much of what had been said by Chief Justice Chase regarding slavery being abolished by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment, he did not believe it applied to this particular case because there was no evidence presented showing any form of involuntary servitude or peonage associated with this ordinance. He further stated that even if one assumed it did apply here then they would be extending its reach beyond what Congress intended when enacting it and thus creating new law which is outside their purview as judges. Ultimately he concluded that since there was no proof provided demonstrating any type of forced labor or other forms of servitude related to this ordinance then it should stand as valid legislation under both state and federal laws at present time