Mays v. Fritton was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1872. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a steamboat. The plaintiff, Mays, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Fritton, to purchase a steamboat for $2,000. Mays paid the full amount, but Fritton refused to deliver the boat. Mays then sued Fritton for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that Fritton was liable for breach of contract. The Court found that the contract was valid and enforceable, and that Fritton had breached the contract by failing to deliver the boat. The Court also held that Mays was entitled to damages for the breach of contract. The Court awarded Mays the full amount of the purchase price, plus interest, as damages for the breach. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that Fritton was liable for breach of contract and awarded Mays the full amount of the purchase price, plus interest, as damages for the breach.

In Mays v. Fritton, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties could be enforced if it had been made in violation of a state law. The majority opinion held that the contract was unenforceable because it violated public policy and thus should not be recognized by courts of equity or common law. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that contracts are binding regardless of their legality under state laws so long as they do not violate any federal statutes or constitutional provisions. He argued that allowing states to invalidate contracts would lead to chaos and uncertainty in commercial transactions, which would ultimately harm both businesses and consumers alike. Furthermore, he noted that there were no specific legal prohibitions against such contracts at the time when they were entered into; therefore, enforcing them did not conflict with any existing laws or policies. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded that while some may find certain contractual arrangements objectionable on moral grounds, these considerations alone cannot justify denying enforcement of valid agreements between consenting parties who have acted in good faith