MCCALL v. CALIFORNIA was a Supreme Court case that was decided in 1977. The case involved a challenge to California's "three strikes" law, which mandated a life sentence for any person convicted of three felonies. The petitioner, William McCall, had been convicted of three felonies and was sentenced to life in prison. McCall argued that the three strikes law was unconstitutional because it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of McCall, finding that the three strikes law was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the law was overly broad and did not take into account the individual circumstances of each case. The Court also noted that the law was disproportionate to the crime, as it imposed a life sentence for a third offense, regardless of the severity of the crime. The Court concluded that the three strikes law violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

In the case of McCall v. California, Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision was wrongfully based on an overly broad interpretation of the First Amendment. He believed that it should not be applied to every state law and regulation, but rather only those laws or regulations which directly impinge upon freedom of speech or press. In this particular case, Justice Frankfurter felt that there was no direct infringement upon either freedom since California had merely imposed certain restrictions on advertising alcoholic beverages without actually prohibiting them from being sold altogether. Furthermore, he argued that such restrictions were necessary for public safety reasons and thus could be justified under existing precedent set by previous Supreme Court cases involving similar issues. Ultimately, Justice Frankfurter concluded his dissent by stating that while he did not necessarily agree with all aspects of California's regulations regarding alcohol advertising, they still fell within constitutional bounds as long as they did not constitute an outright prohibition against free expression or publication rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.