In M'Connell v. The Trustees of the Town of Lexington, the Supreme Court ruled that a state law granting exclusive rights to ferry passengers across the Kentucky River was unconstitutional and violated Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The case stemmed from an 1824 act passed by Kentucky's legislature which granted exclusive rights to William McConnell for operating a ferry service between two points on opposite sides of the river in Fayette County. This act prohibited any other person or entity from running such a service without first obtaining permission from McConnell himself. After several individuals were arrested for violating this law, they filed suit against McConnell and his trustees claiming that it was unconstitutional as it constituted special privileges not available to all citizens equally under federal law. In its ruling, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that while states have certain powers over their internal affairs, these powers are limited when they conflict with those delegated exclusively to Congress by Article I Section 10; thus making this particular legislation invalid as it did not meet constitutional standards set forth by Congress at large.

In M'Connell v. The Trustees of the Town of Lexington, Chief Justice Marshall delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the town trustees had acted within their authority when they passed an ordinance to prevent certain individuals from selling goods on Sundays. He reasoned that since the state legislature had given towns broad powers to regulate their own affairs, it was reasonable for them to pass such an ordinance and enforce it against those who violated its terms. Furthermore, he noted that this particular regulation did not interfere with any religious observances or practices; rather, it simply sought to protect public order by preventing people from engaging in commercial activities on Sundays. Ultimately, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that while there may be some constitutional issues raised by this case – namely whether states can delegate too much power to local governments – these were beyond the scope of what could be decided here and should instead be addressed at a later date if necessary.