Term: 2013
Docket: 12-1168
Mccullen v. Coakley
- Pro
12-1168 McCULLEN V. COAKLEY DECISION BELOW: 708 F.3D 1 CERT. GRANTED 6/24/2013 QUESTION PRESENTED: Massachusetts has made it a crime for speakers to "enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk" within 35 feet of an entrance, exit, or driveway of "a reproductive health care facility." The law applies only at abortion clinics. The law also exempts, among others, clinic "employees or agents ... acting within the scope of their employment." In effect, the law restricts the speech of only those who wish to use public areas near abortion clinics to speak about abortion from a different point of view. Petitioners are individuals who believe that women often have abortions because they feel pressured, alone, unloved, and out of options. Petitioners try to position themselves near clinics in an attempt to reach this unique audience, at a unique moment, to offer support, information, and practical assistance. They are peaceful, non-confrontational, and do not obstruct access. Yet, the State prohibits them from entering or standing on large portions of the public sidewalk to proffer leaflets or seek to begin conversations with willing listeners. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the First Circuit erred in upholding Massachusetts' selective exclusion law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on its face and as applied to petitioners. 2. If Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), permits enforcement of this law, whether Hill should be limited or overruled. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-1334
In the case of McCullen v. Coakley, 2013, the US Supreme Court ruled that a Massachusetts law creating buffer zones around abortion clinics violated the First Amendment rights of anti-abortion protesters. The state had enacted this law in response to concerns about public safety and access to healthcare facilities following violent incidents at clinics. However, Eleanor McCullen and other plaintiffs argued that these restrictions infringed upon their freedom of speech by limiting their ability to engage with women entering these facilities for counseling or protest purposes. In its decision, the court acknowledged that while states have an interest in ensuring public safety and preserving access to reproductive health services, they must do so without infringing on more speech than necessary. Therefore it concluded that Massachusetts' buffer zone law was unconstitutional because it burdened substantially more speech than required to achieve those interests.
In the dissenting opinion for McCullen v. Coakley, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that the Massachusetts law creating a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics was not content-neutral as it favored one side of a political debate. They believed that this violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech. The justices criticized the majority for its "feeble" attempt to portray the law as neutral and accused them of favoritism towards pro-choice views while suppressing anti-abortion messages. They also disagreed with how narrowly tailored they found the statute to be in serving governmental interests; instead arguing that less restrictive alternatives could have been used to achieve these goals without infringing on free speech rights.
