Term: 2014
Docket: 14-378
Mcfadden v. United States
- Pro
14-378 McFADDEN V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 753 F.3d 432 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2015 QUESTION PRESENTED: Federal law criminalizes "knowingly or intentionally" manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing "a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Prohibited "controlled substance[s]" ordinarily are listed in schedules updated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See id. §§ 802(6), 811-12. However, the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 provides that a "controlled substance analogue" also shall be treated as a Schedule I controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 813. A "controlled substance analogue" is defined as a substance with a chemical structure that is "substantially similar" to a schedule I or II drug and has a "substantially similar" effect on the user (or is believed or represented by the defendant to have such a similar effect). Id. § 802(32)(A). The Government does not publish lists of controlled substance analogues; instead, it prosecutes individuals who sell what prosecutors believe to be substances meeting the statutory definition, leaving lay juries to decide whether any given alleged analogue is substantially similar in chemical structure and effect to a scheduled controlled substance, often on the basis of conflicting expert testimony. The Question Presented is: Whether, to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew that the substance constituted a controlled substance analogue, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, but rejected by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 13-4349
In the case of McFadden v. United States, Stephen McFadden was convicted under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act for selling "bath salts," a synthetic drug designed to mimic cocaine or methamphetamine. The issue at hand was whether, in order to convict someone under this act, it must be proven that they knew they were dealing with substances regulated by federal law. In 2014, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of McFadden and held that knowledge about the nature of substance is necessary for conviction under this act. This means prosecutors have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendants knew what they were doing was illegal or had strong reason to believe so.
In the dissenting opinion for McFadden v. United States, Justice Thomas argued that the majority's interpretation of the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act was incorrect. He contended that it is not necessary for a defendant to know that their actions are illegal in order to be found guilty under this law. Instead, he believed that it should only be required for them to knowingly possess or distribute a substance with similar effects and chemical structure as an already controlled substance, regardless of whether they were aware of its legal status. This perspective emphasizes strict liability rather than subjective knowledge about specific laws.
