In the case of McKaskle v. Wiggins, 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a defendant's right to self-representation during trial proceedings. The defendant, Wiggins had chosen to represent himself but was provided with standby counsel by the court against his wishes. He argued that this violated his Sixth Amendment rights as he felt they interfered with his ability to present his defense in accordance with Faretta v California (1975), which affirmed a defendant’s constitutional right to proceed without counsel when they voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that standby counsels' limited participation did not violate Wiggins’ Sixth Amendment rights because their role is merely supportive rather than lead or equal; thus it does not undermine the appearance before jury that defendants are representing themselves if they choose so. The court also stated that such assistance could be beneficial for ensuring procedural rules are followed correctly and can even help prevent any potential disruption caused by an inexperienced pro se litigant (someone who represents themselves). This decision clarified how far courts may go in providing support for self-representing defendants while still respecting their autonomy under Faretta ruling.

In the dissenting opinion for McKaskle v. Wiggins, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that a defendant's right to self-representation is undermined when counsel interferes without the defendant's consent. He believed that such interference could confuse jurors about who was in control of the defense and potentially undermine its effectiveness. The majority held that standby counsel may assist in the defense as long as they do not interfere with significant tactical decisions, but Justice Marshall disagreed with this interpretation of Faretta v. California (1975). In his view, any unsolicited participation by counsel infringes upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to conduct their own defense.