In the case of McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, et al. v. DeChamplain in 1974, the United States Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a member of the armed forces could be tried and convicted by court-martial for an offense that had previously been tried in a civilian court. The defendant, Sergeant DeChamplain, had been acquitted on charges related to marijuana possession and distribution in a federal district court but was later convicted on similar charges under military law at his subsequent court-martial trial. He argued this constituted double jeopardy - being tried twice for the same crime - which is prohibited by Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court disagreed with DeChamplain's argument ruling that separate sovereigns (in this case civil authorities and military authorities) can prosecute individuals separately without violating their constitutional protection against double jeopardy because each has its own interest to protect; civilian society from criminal behavior and military service from conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.

In the dissenting opinion for McLucas v. DeChamplain, Justice Douglas argued that the military should not be allowed to court-martial a serviceman for an offense committed while he was a civilian and had no connection with his military service. He believed this violated the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause, which prevents someone from being tried twice for the same crime. The majority ruled that because DeChamplain reenlisted in the Air Force after committing robbery as a civilian, he could be court-martialed by military authorities even though he had already been acquitted in civil court. However, Justice Douglas disagreed with this interpretation of jurisdictional boundaries between civil and military law enforcement systems.