| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

In the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran et al., 1981, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that private parties could bring lawsuits under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) for damages caused by price manipulation and other fraudulent practices even though such right was not explicitly mentioned in CEA's text. The plaintiffs were customers who had purchased commodity futures contracts through Merrill Lynch and claimed they suffered losses due to illegal market manipulations by others which Merrill Lynch failed to prevent or disclose. The court reasoned that when Congress amended CEA in 1974 without removing this implied right of action recognized by lower courts earlier, it effectively endorsed it.
In the dissenting opinion for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran et al., Justice Powell argued that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). He pointed out that when Congress wanted to provide such a remedy in securities laws, it explicitly did so and thus its silence on this matter in CEA should be interpreted as intentional. Furthermore, he contended that implying such rights would lead to an increase in litigation which could potentially harm innocent parties due to increased costs and risks associated with commodity trading. He also expressed concern about courts overstepping their boundaries by creating law rather than interpreting it.