Meyer v. Hornby was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, Meyer, was arrested and held in federal custody in the state of Missouri. Meyer sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, which the court granted. The federal government then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect the rights of its citizens. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect the rights of its citizens.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Meyer v. Hornby, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to a dangerous expansion of state power over private property rights. He argued that under existing law, states had no authority to interfere with an individual's right to use their own land as they saw fit unless it posed a direct threat or nuisance to others. The majority opinion allowed for such interference by allowing states broad discretion in determining when certain activities constituted nuisances and could be regulated accordingly. Justice Field believed this gave too much power to the states at the expense of individuals' constitutional rights and should not be permitted without clear legislative guidance from Congress on how these powers were intended to be used.