Meyers v. Block was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The case arose when the petitioner, Meyers, was arrested by federal officers and taken into federal custody. Meyers then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a state court, seeking to be released from federal custody. The state court granted the writ, and the federal officers refused to comply. The federal officers then appealed the state court's decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the federal government had the exclusive power to protect this right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Meyers v. Block, arguing that the majority's decision was wrongfully decided and should be reversed. He argued that a state law allowing for an action of ejectment to recover possession of land could not be superseded by federal statutes which provided for different remedies. In his view, Congress had no power to interfere with state laws concerning real property rights unless it was expressly authorized by the Constitution or necessary to carry out its powers under other provisions of the Constitution. Furthermore, he believed that if Congress did have such authority then it would need to provide clear language indicating so in order for any interference with state laws on this matter to take effect; however, he found nothing in either statute cited by the majority as evidence of congressional intent regarding preemption over matters related to real estate rights within states' jurisdiction. Therefore, Justice Field concluded that since there were no express words granting Congress such authority and because these statutes did not necessarily imply any intention from Congress regarding preemption over matters related to real estate rights within states' jurisdiction then they should not be interpreted as having preemptive force against existing state law on this issue and thus must fail as a basis for reversing judgment below