In the 1973 case Michigan v. Tucker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a confession obtained by police without informing the suspect of his right to counsel was admissible in court because it did not violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. The defendant, Richard Tucker, had been questioned about a rape without being fully informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966). While he was told he could remain silent and anything he said could be used against him in court, officers failed to inform him that if he couldn't afford an attorney one would be appointed for him before questioning began. Despite this omission, Tucker confessed to participating in the crime but later sought to suppress his statements arguing they were taken in violation of Miranda rules. However, since these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by Constitution but rather measures intended to safeguard constitutional rights - specifically those under Fifth Amendment - their violation didn’t necessarily mean constitutional infringement occurred.

In the dissenting opinion for Michigan v. Tucker, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the majority's decision undermined the principles established in Miranda v. Arizona and weakened protections against self-incrimination. He contended that by allowing a confession obtained without full Miranda warnings to be used for impeachment purposes, it created an incentive for police to ignore these rights during interrogations with hopes of obtaining incriminating statements which could later be used at trial if necessary. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view that Tucker had not been deprived of his constitutional rights because he was aware of his right to remain silent and had access to counsel prior to interrogation; instead, Douglas believed this ignored how coercive police questioning can be even when suspects are nominally aware of their rights.