In Micou v. National Bank, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a national bank could be held liable for the wrongful acts of its officers. The case arose when the plaintiff, Micou, sued the National Bank of the United States for damages resulting from the wrongful acts of its officers. The bank argued that it could not be held liable for the acts of its officers because it was a corporation and not a natural person. The Supreme Court held that the bank could be held liable for the wrongful acts of its officers. The Court reasoned that the bank was a corporation and, as such, was capable of committing wrongs and being held liable for them. The Court further reasoned that the bank was a creature of the law and, as such, was subject to the same rules of liability as any other person or corporation. The Court concluded that the bank could be held liable for the wrongful acts of its officers and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from the bank. This decision established the principle that a corporation can be held liable for the wrongful acts of its officers and agents.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Micou v. National Bank, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that a bank should not be allowed to collect interest on its own notes when it has failed to pay out money due on them at maturity. The defendant had issued notes payable at their office, but failed to make payment upon demand of the plaintiff as required by law; thus, they were liable for damages resulting from such failure. Justice Field reasoned that if banks are allowed this privilege then they will have no incentive whatsoever to honor their obligations and creditors will suffer greatly as a result. Furthermore, he noted that allowing banks this privilege would create an unequal playing field between debtors and creditors since other debtors do not enjoy such protection under existing laws or common practice. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating his belief that "the rule laid down by [the] court is wrong in principle" because it allows banks too much latitude while simultaneously disregarding creditor rights altogether