Miller v. Joseph et al. was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, Miller, was held in federal custody in the state of Missouri. Miller sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, which the court granted. The federal government then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Miller v. Joseph et al., arguing that the majority had misinterpreted a California statute and misapplied it to the facts of this case. He argued that under California law, when an executor or administrator is appointed by a court to manage an estate, they are not personally liable for any debts incurred while managing said estate unless specifically authorized by order of court. In this case, he argued that there was no such authorization from the court and thus Miller could not recover damages from Joseph as his personal representative. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if there had been such authorization from the Court, it would have only applied to those creditors who were known at time of appointment; since Miller's claim arose after Joseph's appointment as executor/administrator he should not be held responsible for its payment either way.